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Anatomy of a Trade Dispute:
The Question of Softwood Lumber
Peter A. Piliounis*
It has been called "the longest and messiest trade war Canada
and the United States have ever had."1 Without a doubt, the issue of
softwood lumber pricing has long been a major irritant in CanadaUnited States trade relations. On three separate occasions, the United
States has launched a countervailing duty investigation into Canadian
timber pricing practices. Softwood lumber plays a key role in the
economies of several Canadian provinces and American states.2 The
stakes are not only high for softwood lumber products, 3 but any decision
made on softwood lumber could also have an enormous impact on other
forest products and the trade in natural resources as a whole.
The question of subsidization of natural resources is a contested
issue around the world. At issue with softwood lumber is the method in
which certain Canadian provinces price their timber for cutting. Each
province has its own procedure for setting the price to sell the rights to
cut standing timber on provincial Crown land. This price paid by the
logging companies for the timber is referred to as a 'stumpage fee'. In
general, Canadian stumpage fees are lower than their counterparts in
the United States.
The softwood lumber case illustrates the controversy over valuation and possible subsidization of natural resources by posing two
fundamental questions:

1) Do natural resource subsidies constitute countervailable
domestic subsidies under Article XVI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)?
2) If natural resource subsidies are considered countervailable,
do Canadian practices with regard to softwood lumber stumpage
fees constitute such a subsidy?
The answers to both questions are not clear. This study traces the
development of the softwood lumber dispute and United States trade law
as they relate to both issues, including potential future actions and
political implications.
The key points raised by this study rest on the definition of
"subsidy" and whether a countervailable subsidy has been provided to
Canadian softwood lumber producers, especially in the four major
softwood producing provinces: British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario, and
Quebec.4
The internal United States process for determining whether a
countervailing duty should be imposed is made up of two components.
The first requires an injury to an American industry, which is deter-
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mined by the United States International Trade Commission (ITC).
While this process might also merit analysis, the main areas of dispute
for softwood lumber are over findings from the second element of a
countervailing duty investigation.
This second component of the investigation is carried out by the
United States International Trade Administration CITA). The ITA
decides whether the practices in question are ones that can be subject to
a countervailing duty under United States trade law. Thus, this study
focuses on the criteria used by the ITA and how they fit into international
trade law under the Free Trade Agreement (FTA)5 and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

PREVIOUS DEVELOPMENTS
The two decisions ofthe ITA during the 1980s regarding softwood
lumber turned on entirely different answers to the questions posed
above. They differed not only on whether Canadian stumpage prices
could be considered countervailable subsidies, but also whether any
benefit provided by lower stumpage fees was in itself specific enough to
be countervailable.

The 1983 Final Negative Determination
In 1982, a group of American lumber producers launched an
action against Canadian lumber, alleging unfair subsidies and asking
for a countervailing duty of sixty-five per cent. 6 In the Final Negative
Countervailing Duty Determinations; Certain Softwood Products from
Canada (Lumber 1),7 the ITA rejected these arguments. It found that
any benefits provided to manufacturers, producers or exporters in
Canada were de minimus and, therefore, did not constitute
countervailable subsidies under the United States Tariff Act of 1930.8
However, those programmes that the ITA deemed to constitute de
minimus benefits did not include Canadian stumpage practices (with
the minor exception of some aspects of the Ontario and Quebec programmes).9
The ITA held that stumpage pricing practices did not constitute
an export subsidy because "they do not operate and are not intended to
stimulate export rather than domestic sales, and because they are not
offered contingent upon economic performance".10 The ITA also determined that stumpage practices did not constitute a countervailable
domestic subsidy within the meaning of Section 771(5)(B) of the United
States Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 11 which lists domestic subsidies
as follows:
(i)

(ii)

The provision of capital, loans or loan guarantees on terms inconsistent with commercial considerations.
The provision of goods or services at preferential
rates.
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(iii)
(iv)

The grant offunds or forgiveness of debt to cover
operating losses sustained by a particular industry.
The assumption of any costs or expenses of
manufacture, production, or distribution.

The ITA interpreted provisions (i)-(iv) to be mutually exclusive,
so that if a programme clearly fell within one of the subsections, it had
to be measured against the standard provided in that subsection.12 In
this situation, the ITA decided that the appropriate provision was
Subsection (ii) because it involved the provision of goods (here, stands of
timber) by a government. No subsidy was found since the ITA held that
stumpage programmes did not
softwood lumber producers with
lumber at 'preferential rates'.1
This finding went against the American lumber industry petitioners, who had argued that the stumpage programmes should fall
under Subsection (iv) as an 'assumption' of the cost of production. The
ITA interpreted 'assumption' narrowly, to mean "government activity
which relieves an enterf rise or industry of a pre-existing statutory or
contractual obligation." 4 The ITA also suggested that even a broader
interpretation of Subsection (iv) would not find a subsidy since stumpage
programmes did not reduce (or assume) a cost of production. In reaching
this conclusion, the ITA rejected making a cross-border comparison of
stumpage prices in Canada with those in the United States. It suggested
that such a comparison would be "arbitrary and capricious" for several
reasons, most notably the wide variations in climate, terrain, accessibility, size, quality, and density oftimber.15 The ITA even suggested that
if all the appropriate differences were taken into account and adjusted
for, Canadian prices for standing timber did not differ significantly from
United States timber and in some instances might even be higher.16
Notwithstanding this, even if stumpage prices were considered
to be subsidies, the ITA found that the benefits were not provided to a
specific industry or group of industries as required by American trade
legislation.17 The ITA considered stumpage fees to be the same
regardless of the industry or enterprise using the timber. Therefore, any
benefit accruing from stumpage prices was considered to be available
generally. Most notably, the ITA found that any limitation on use of the
timber was attributable to the nature of timber extraction itself and not
to any actions taken by Canadian governments.18
To further decide the specificity question, the ITA considered
which industries benefitted from the stumpage fees and found that
several different industries used the timber, each requiring different
equipment and processing. Those industries were:
1)
2)
3)
4)

Lumber and wood products industries;
Veneer, plywood, and building boards industries;
Pulp and paper industries;
Furniture industries; and
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5) Other industries- producing turpentine, charcoal,
wood alcohol, and food additives.19
The ITA also noted that under both the Canadian and American
industrial classification systems, the lumber, pulp and paper, and
furniture industries constituted at least three different groups of industries. In light of the findings of general availability without government
intervention and use by diverse industries, stumpage fees were held to
be available generally.20
·
Some have even suggested that this ruling was decided in
Canada's favour because of the political climate in Canada-United
States relations and not on the merits of the case.21 It has been alleged
that at that time, Prime Minister Trudeau threatened President Reagan
with ending cruise missile tests in Canada if a countervailing duty were
imposed on softwood lumber. As we shall see, almost all aspects of this
case are weighted with political overtones and could potentially have an
impact in fields totally unrelated to softwood lumber.

Developments in United States Trade Law 1983-1986
Between the Lumber I negative determination in 1983 and the
subsequent preliminary positive determination in 1986, circumstances
had not significantly changed in Canadian stumpage practices and
policies. What had changed, however, was United States trade law. In
Cabot Corp. v. United States, 22 the United States Court ofinternational
Trade (CIT) heavily criticized the ITA for its interpretation of what
constituted a countervailable subsidy when considering natural resources. Cabot Corp. v. United States involved judicial review of an ITA
decision in a Mexican case on the general availability of carbon black
feedstock to producers of carbon black, which is used primarily in the
rubber industry. In that case, the ITAhad ruled against a countervailing
duty for reasons similar to those given in Lumber /.23 Upon review, the
CIT made it very clear that "the generally available benefits rule as
developed and applied by the ITA is not an acceptable legal standard for
determining the countervailability of benefits".24 The court instead
found that certain programmes, while having the intention or appearance of being generally available, had the effect of being conferred upon
specific industries or enterprises and, thus, were countervailable. The
court held:
The appropriate standard focuses on the de facto case by
case effect of benefits provided to recipients rather than
on the nominal availability ofbenefits.25
The ITA applied the new test laid out by the CIT in its administrative
review of the Carbon Black case in late 1986.26 However, prior to the
final determination, the ITA took the unusual step of briefing Senators
from lumber states about the new test for specificity. Some argue that
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this briefing was little more than a "green light" for lumber producers to
launch a new countervail action.27

The 1986 Preliminary Positive Determination
Applying the newer broader specificity test, a different conclusion was reached in Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada ("Lumber
II"). 28 The ITA changed not only its ruling on whether stumpage prices
were generally available, but also considered stumpage to be a method
of preferential pricing and, therefore, countervailable.
To decide whether stumpage practices were de facto specific, the
ITA laid out the following three factors to consider:
[1] The extent to which a foreign government acts to
limit the availability of a programme;
[2] the number of enterprises, industries, or groups
thereof which actually use a program, which may include the examination of disproportionate or dominant
users; and
[3] the extent to which the government exercises discretion in making the programmes available. 29
When the ITA considered stumpage programmes against these criteria,
it held that the Canadian governments involved exercised "considerable
discretion in the allocation of stumpage licenses."30 Although the ITA
admitted difficulty locating information on this point, it held that this
discretion skewed the allocation of stumpage rights toward the softwood
lumber industry.
The ITA also went on to state that the number of enterprises
actually making use of the stumpage rights was not as large as suggested
in Lumber I. First, it held that furniture manufacturers own 'negligible
rights'.31 Second, it placed great emphasis on the integrated nature of
the softwood lumber industry with the pulp and paper industry. It found
that the two industries tended to be made up of horizontally-integrated
companies involved in both activities.32 In today's world of huge multifaceted corporations and conglomerates, this finding could have significant repercussions. In a small marketplace such as Canada's, there is
likely to be a number oflarge corporations involved in various aspects of
natural resource extraction and production. This finding implies that
any of these companies could be subject to the threat of countervailing
dutI even if the various divisions used different equipment and processing 3 and were in no way related other than in name. 34
Once the ITA had determined that stumpage was not generally
available, it considered whether or not stumpage was provided at
preferential rates'. 35 In deciding whether preferential rates were given,
the ITA applied a new rate comparison test, based on one of the following
four factors (ranked in order of preference by the ITA):
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[1] Prices charged by the government for a similar or
related good;
[2] prices charged within the jurisdiction by other sellers
for an identical good or service;
[3] the government's cost of producing the good or service; and
[4] external prices. 36
The ITA decided that the appropriate test to determine
subsidization here was the third option, the government's cost of producing the good or service. Under this test, the ITA found that Alberta,
British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec did not recover the costs of
providing standing timber to the holders of stumpage rights. However,
in determining the cost of providing the lumber to the producers, the ITA
added the "intrinsic value of the tree and the land", along with any costs
directly associated with providing the timber.37 This imputed cost for
the intrinsic value of the timber has been the subject of much criticism,
especially since the provincial governments incurred no cost in obtaining
the standing timber in the first place. 38As well, this approach is seen as
"double counting" since any "retail" stumpage cost would already include
direct costs. Therefore, adding the two costs would involve counting the
direct costs twice.
To determine the intrinsic value of the timber (no mention is
made of land by the ITA in this portion of the decision), the ITA uses
various 'surrogates'. For stumpage in British Columbia and Alberta, the
ITA used "competitive bid prices under government administered programmes". Since no competitive bid prices were available from Ontario
and Quebec, the ITA used private prices as reported from New Brunswick.39 These surrogates can be attacked on two grounds:40
1) Earlier in the decision, the ITA recognized the perils of
comparing competitively bid and non-competitively bid stumpage
sales, as the competitive sales were not seen as providing an
accurate measure of price differences.41 Nonetheless, the ITA
used competitively bid prices as surrogates to determine the
value of the timber. This suggests that the surrogate prices may
not be an accurate measure.
2) In the case of Ontario and Quebec, New Brunswick prices were
used as surrogates. However, in Lumber I, the ITA held that
cross-border stumpage comparisons were "arbitrary and capricious", due to the many differences in timber quality, accessibility, and the like. Any drawbacks of a comparison between
Canada and the United States would also exist when using New
Brunswick stumpage fees as surrogate pricing for Ontario and
Quebec timber.
The end result of the ITA's analysis was that it made a preliminary
finding of a countervailable subsidy of fifteen per cent.42 While it is
possible that any defects in reasoning of Lumber II would have been
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corrected in a Final Determination, the subject never proceeded to that
stage.
The political considerations at the time of this decision slanted
toward the United States lumber concerns. In late 1986, President
Reagan sought Senate apptoval for free trade talks with Canada.
Several Senators made it clear that their approval of such negotiations
depended upon a satisfactory outcome to the softwood lumber dispute. 43
The strength of such a Senate reaction has been attributed to the
estimated $2-3 million spent on lobbying by the American lumber
industry.44

The Memorandum of Understanding
On December 30, 1986, the same day that the ITA was due to.
release its Final Determination, Canada and the United States entered
into a Memorandum of Understanding,45 later enacted in Canada by
the Softwood Lumber Products Export Charge Act. 46 The general thrust
of the MOU is that Canada would impose a fifteen per cent export tax on
softwood lumber destined for the United States in exchange for the
withdrawal of the countervailing duty investigation. There are several
possible reasons for Canada to enter into the MOU.
First, the MOU enabled Canada to keep the expected $400
million (U.S.) in tax revenues in the country, rather than enriching
American coffers.47 The tax revenues would then be distributed to the
affected provinces. In this way, Canada was able to make "the best out
ofa bad situation'', since the ITA was unlikely to reverse its findings and
since the MOU was:
... without prejudice to the position ofeither Government
as to whether the stumpage programs and practices of
the Canadian governments constitute subsidies under
United States law or any international agreement.48
The mere signing of the MOU and the imposition of a fifteen per cent
export tax may, however, have admitted implicitly that the United
States position was correct.49
Second, the MOU had the effect of rendering the Preliminary
Determination of Lumber II of no legal force and effect. 50 The purpose
of such a provision appears to have been to halt the development of
United States trade law and precedent regarding the newer tests for
specificity and 'preferential rates'. If this were the intended purpose,
however, the MOU was not successful in stopping the evolution of United
States trade law. 51 In fact, the de facto test laid out in the decision of the
CIT in Cabot Corporation was later codified into American law.52
Since the enactment of the MOU, it has been amended several
times. Some of these amendments were made to reduce the amount of
export tax payable in certain provinces after they implemented 'replacement measures' which increased the price of timber in order to offset the
export tax. The first amendment, which took place in December 1987,
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exempted the Atlantic provinces from the fifteen per cent export tax as
most stumpage prices from those provinces were bid competitively from
privately-held land. This amendment also approved certain replacement measures for the province of British Columbia that were considered equivalent to the export tax. 53 The new British Columbia measures, called the Comparative Value Pricing System, essentially target
the amount ofrevenue that would have been raised by the export tax and
increase the price of softwood stumpage accordingly. Quebec also later
instituted some replacement measures under the MOU, but these were
not enough to offset fully the export tax. 54
The interesting feature about these replacement measures is
that they had to be approved by the United States Department of
Commerce. As well, in interpreting the MOU, the United States
government stated that it would not approve any change to the MOU
without the prior approval of the petitioning United States lumber
interests.55 In effect, the American lumber industry was in a position
to dictate Canadian stumpage policy. Therefore, while a tariff at the
border or an export tax would be completely in line with state sovereignty, having new stumpage policy 'cleared' by foreign competitors
seems an odd step to be agreed by the Canadian government. Once the
agreement was signed, however, the actions taken by the United States
government were wholly appropriate, even if they served to infringe on
Canadian sovereignty.56 Any fault for limiting Canada's freedom to
determine natural resource policies lay not with actions taken under the
MOU, but the
of the MOU itself.
On a purely economic level, the MOU led to increased timber
prices for American consumers. In addition, replacement measures
under the MOU were not as beneficial to Canadian consumers as had
been the export tax. The export tax, by its very nature, applied only to
softwood lumber leaving the country. On the other hand, replacement
measures applied across the board to all stumpage and consequently
increased the domestic price for Canadian consumers.
On October 3, 1991, Canada officially rescinded the MOU with
the United States. The reasons for this were two-fold: first, Canada had
conducted a study of the stumpage practices of British Columbia,
Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec. The Canadian study utilized the Timber
Sale Program Information Reporting System (TSPIRS) cost-accounting
method of the United States Forest Service to determine the stumpage
prices. TSPIRS had been developed by the Forest Service for internal
use (and has since been approved by Congress) to determine the proper
value of forest resources.57 Its methodology includes a comparison of
the costs and associated revenues of providing timber. The study
adapted TSPIRS to the Canadian process and calculated that in each of
the provinces revenues received from stumpage exceeded the costs of
providing the timber.58 This approach suggests that the Canadian
position is based upon using TSPIRS as the methodology for the "cost of
providing the service" test articulated in Lumber II. 59
Second, when Canada and the United States concluded the FTA,
the MOU was specifically 'grandfathered' into the agreement.60 This

79

SOFTWOOD LUMBER
meant that any disputes over softwood lumber would have to be addressed under the MOU, rather than through the dispute settlement
mechanism under the FTA. 61 The United States, however, was unwilling to reopen the issue.62 Therefore, by rescinding the MOU, Canada
was hoping to bring the dispute under the possible binding arbitration
of a Binational Panel created under Chapter 19 of the FTA.
The United States responded to the rescission of the MOU by
requiring that a bond be posted by Canadian exporters, equivalent to the
tax that would have been collected under the MOU.63 As well, the
United States government took the rare step of self-initiating a
countervailing duty investigation into Canadian stumpage practices,
without a formal complainant from the American lumber industry. 64
The United States considers that these measures are merely 'enforcement measures' under the MOU and, therefore, are exempt from consideration under the FTA.65 This view also holds that any countervailing
duty later imposed by the United States government would not be open
for review under the FTA, since the MOU had been specifically exempted.

CANADIAN AND AMERICAN POSITIONS
The arguments now presented by Canada are variations on the
same theme that has run through the entire softwood lumber dispute.
First, Canada rejects the contention that natural resource subsidies can
be considered countervailable. Second, in the alternative, even if
natural resource subsidies can be considered countervailable, Canada
argues that its practices with regard to softwood lumber stumpage
pricing do not constitute subsidies under United States trade law.
The first facet of the argument is being pursued by Canada at
GATT. It is unclear why Canada decided not to pursue actions before
GATT prior to the current investigation. The question of whether
natural resources can be the subject of countervailing duties is the same
today as it was in both 1983 and 1986. Once the MOU was signed,
however, both parties probably assumed the dispute was settled and
likely perceived no need to go before GATT. That Canada decided to
bring the action to GATT is in itself not surprising, since the action
requires expertise on the definition of 'subsidy' under GATT. Actions
such as these do not suggest 'forum shopping' between GATT and
Chapter 18 oftheFTA,66 at least not until Canada and the United States
have agreed upon a subsidies code under the FTA.

GATT
The arguments before GATT depend upon the interpretation of
'subsidy' and acceptable countervailing duties under Articles VI and XVI
of GATT. This discussion will focus upon 'domestic subsidies' as both
previous softwood lumber decisions have rejected stumpage fees as
export subsidies.
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Article XVI in no way prohibits the free pricing of governmentowned resources, nor domestic subsidies on natural resources, except
insofar as to say that any subsidy should not result in that country
"having more than an equitable share of world trade in that product". 67
Article 11 of the Subsidies Code agreed upon at the Tokyo Round of
GATT68 recognizes the value of domestic subsidies and calls upon GATT
signatories to "seek to avoid causing [injury to another signatory's
industry] through the use of subsidies."69 These provisions are not
determinative of the issue at hand. Other applicable provisions can be
found in GATT Article VI and its interpretation in the Subsidies Code.
Article VI deals with the imposition of anti-dumping and
countervailing duties. Article VI:3 allows the imposition ofcountervailing
duties to counteract a "bounty or subsidy ... granted, directly or indirectly, on the manufacture, production or export" of a product. In the
Subsidies Code, an illustrative list of what is considered a subsidy was
given. 70 While natural resource subsidies were not included in the list,
Article VI:3 appears broad enough to cover low stumpage fees, if they are
considered an indirect bounty or subsidy to Canadian lumber producers. 71 However, as an exception to the Most-Favoured-Nation treatment under GATT, Article VI:3 has in the past been construed narrowly,
with the party relying on the exception being required to prove it. 72 If
a panel were to give such a narrow reading to Article VI:3 in this case,
the dispute would probably be resolved in Canada's favour, as the actual
payment of a "bounty or grant" is not apparent in this case, where the
issue is the selling price of a government-owned resource.
In addition to arguments based on the current formulation of
GATT, some drafts of the GATT Uruguay Round Subsidies Code would
work in Canada's favour. 73 For example, Article 14(e) reads (in part) as
follows:
When the government is the sole provider or purchaser
of the good or service in question, the provision or
purchase of such good or service shall not be considered
as conferring a benefit, unless the government discriminates among users or providers of the good or service
74
Whatever the resolution of the dispute at GATT, any GATT Panel's
results are not binding. The onus would be upon Canada or the United
States to implement the panel's findings as they saw fit. 75 If the panel's
findings were rejected, they would have no legal impact on any FTA
Panel, but the decision might be of some persuasive merit.
On one hand, an extra benefit of a GATT Panel ruling would be
that particular American legislation could be challenged as being inconsistent with GATTobligations. On the other hand, a panel created under
Chapter 19 of the FTA would be bound to interpret the matter in
accordance with existing United States trade law, whether or not they
agreed with the validity of such legislation.
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United States Trade Law
The situation has changed fundamentally since the preliminary
positive determination of Lumber II. Since that time, Canada and the
United States have signed the FTA and many Canadian lumber pricing
practices are significantly different (including replacement measures
under the MOU), while United States trade law is roughly the same. 76
Chapter 19 of the FTA allows for a Binational Panel to be created
to review final anti-dumping and countervailing duty determinations.
The decisions of this panel are binding upon the appropriate administrative agency (here, the ITA). As the softwood lumber dispute is so
vigorously contested, it is almost assured that no matter what determination is made by the ITA, the dispute will proceed to the Binational
Panel. While the United States contends that the current 'enforcement
measures' are components of the MOU and therefore exempted from
FTA consideration, the following discussion is premised on the assumption that the rescission of the MOU will be considered sufficient to
surpass the exemption given to the MOU under Article 2009 of the FTA.
Since the FTA is intended to be an all-encompassing document, an
exemption related to a validly rescinded agreement makes little sense.
Therefore, it appears likely that investigations of softwood lumber
practices will fall under the purview of the FTA, rather than being
considered as 'enforcement measures' under the MOU.
Prior to the implementation of the FTA, analysts predicted that
Chapter 19 Binational Panels would show considerable deference and
not be willing to contradict ITA (or ITC) practice unless it were found to
be 'unreasonable'. 77 However, this has not turned out to be the case; as
of July, 1991, four panel decisions had been made reversing final
determinations of the ITA or ITC in favour of Canadian interests.78 In
particular, one decision of the panel reviewing an ITA determination on
pork79 is of note for the softwood lumber dispute. In that decision, the
panel showed a willingness to second-guess the application of the de
facto specificity test by the ITA. The panel ruled not only against the
ITA, but also placed the added burden on the ITA (or the complainant)
to prove with "convincing circumstantial or actual evidence" that the
exporting government was in fact limiting the benefits to a specific
industry or group of industries. 80 Therefore, any decision of the ITA on
softwood lumber would likely be subject to a higher standard of review
than would have been the case in 1986. Because of this new level of
scrutiny, Canadian officials are hoping that the ITA will take this into
account in its reasoning, so that logical flaws similar to those which
occurred in Lumber II will not repeat themselves in the current investigation. Bl
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CONCLUSIONS
Softwood lumber and natural resource subsidies have been the
subject of many political, economic, and legal analyses. An overview
such as this cannot but scratch the surface of the dispute. Nonetheless,
it can serve to point out the substantive areas of dispute.
The true question of whether Canadian stumpage fees represent
a countervailable subsidy is, in essence, a reflection of the difference in
lumber practices between Canada and the United States. In the end, the
cost of delivering cut logs to the sawmill is roughly the same in both
countries.82 Therefore, it can be argued that the ability to provide low
cost stumpage in Canada and the ability to harvest the logs at a lower
cost in the United States provides each country with a comparative
advantage.83 Neither country wishes to give up what it sees as its
competitive edge over the neighbouring country. By the same token,
American lumber interests would likely not complain about low stumpage
rates if they could take advantage of them as well. Yet many provinces
have placed restrictions upon the export of logs. 84 Therefore, only
sawmills located in Canada can benefit from lower priced (or subsidized)
stumpage. Thus, the true trade barrier could be seen as log export
restraints rather than stumpage practices.85
Another complicating factor is that the market share of Canadian lumber in the United States does not appear to be as tied to the cost
of stumpage as to the exchange rate of the Canadian dollar86 and the
sheer volume of timber actually available for harvest in Canada.87
Thus, when the MOU came into force in 1987, the output of the Canadian
lumber industry remained relatively unchanged. 88 While United States
producers might benefit from the imposition of a countervailing duty
(from increased costs to their competitors) in the short run, the long run
picture would not be greatly affected. Canadian producers would still
have a greater supply of timber and American producers would still be
at a comparative disadvantage. In the long run, American producers
would have a proportionately lower volume of timber than their Canadian counterparts due to the extra harvesting of timber that would take
place with a short term increase in market share. Perhaps the appropriate remedy for the softwood lumber dispute (as well as others dealing
with natural resources) is not the blunt imposition of trade laws. The
nations involved should instead negotiate to remove the other barriers
to trade, while recognizing each region's distinct comparative position
(stumpage fees, quality of timber, accessibility, and so on). This argument especially rings true with the current focus on environmental
concerns and the priority placed on preserving forests and reforestation.89
The political stakes of the current dispute are as high as ever.
Both Canada and the United States will be facing major elections in the
coming years and the politicians involved will probably take less compromising stances on this issue than would otherwise be the case. The
American lumber lobby has already been pushing heavily for sanctions
and has been accredited with the speed with which the United States
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Department of Commerce launched its current investigation. 90 As well,
if this dispute goes to a Binational Panel, which is likely, the outcome will
be very important for future Canada-United States trade disputes. In
1991, the highly politicized question regarding injury to American
producers from lower priced Canadian pork resulted in the United
States pursuit of an extraordinary challenge under the FTA.91 In that
matter, the ITC showed considerable displeasure with the functioning of
the Binational Panel. 92 If a similar situation arose with the ITA over a
decision of a Binational Panel on softwood lumber, the entire Chapter 19
dispute resolution process might be placed in jeopardy, as the United
States government might consider the panels biased towards Canadian
interests. Such a development is mere speculation at this point,
however, as the dispute has not yet progressed through the full ITA
process.
The apparent strength of the American lumber lobby and the
comparative weakness of its Canadian counterpart suggests that the
ITA will find in favour of the American producers.93 Nonetheless, the
Canadian lumber producers are confident that they will win in any
decision 'on the merits'. As discussed throughout this study, the true
'merits' of this case are unclear. For example, the Canadian Maritime
provinces have even decided to side with the American lumber industry
against the other provinces, 94 while a prominent newspaper in the
United States Pacific Northwest (a major softwood lumber-producing
region) has supported the Canadian position. 95 Regardless of the
outcome, it is unlikely that the affected provinces will give up the
revenues obtained through any replacement measures. In British
Columbia, for instance, revenues from stumpage fees account for five per
cent of the total provincial budget.96
So long as there is an opportunity for one side to gain a shortterm competitive advantage through the use of trade laws, the issue of
softwood lumber will probably never be far from the forefront. Its
importance to provincial and state economies guarantees that those
affected will try to gain every competitive advantage possible. Because
of this problem, it seems unlikely that there will be a negotiated
comprehensive settlement of this dispute in the near future and potentially unpredictable trade laws will continue to be the method of choice.
As was succinctly put by a former American lobbyist: "It's better than the
lottery ... It's just such a jackpot; if you win, you win big. You do the
financial calculations, and you'd be foolish not to roll the dice."97
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